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Rethinking the Role of National Courts in European Integration: 
A Political Study of British Judicial Discretion
Jonathan Golub
Introduction
Since the early 1980s, there has been an increasing awareness that the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) plays a significant role in the process of 
European integration. Indeed, the supremacy of EC law and the powerful role of 
the ECJ provide the Community with supranational characteristics which 
distinguish it from traditional international organisations. It has also become 
widely recognised that development of the Community's supranational "new legal 
order"—which has transformed the treaty into a constitution, provided the 
foundation upon which to build an integrated European economy, and restricted 
the sovereignty and political autonomy of the member states—relies heavily on 
the co-operation of national courts and their decision to make preliminary 
references under the terms of Article 177 of the Treaty.1 The Court's handling of 
preliminary references has sometimes led to claims that the it exhibits a 
consistent pro-integration bias and a willingness to pursue its own political 
agenda.2
Despite the political significance of preliminary references within this new 
legal order, analysis of the ECJ and of member state courts has mostly been 
confined to legal scholarship, with only a few notable exceptions which explore
1The ECJ described the Community as a "new legal order" in its seminal Van Gend ruling. 
See Case 25/62 [1963] European Court Reports. Article 177 allows questions to be 
referred to the ECJ by national courts which consider a decision on the question necessary 
in the immediate case. The ECJ may give preliminary rulings on interpretation of the 
Treaty, and on the legal validity and interpretation of EC actions.
2For earlier accounts of the ECJ's role in integration, see Stuart Scheingold, The Law in 
Political Integration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Henry Schermers, "The 
European Court of Justice: Promoter of European Integration," 22 American Journal o f 
Comparative Law 444 (1974). For an extremely critical view of the Court's activities, see 
Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court o f Justice: A Comparative 



























































































the political aspects of judicial activity.3 A common element in integration 
studies which do attempt to combine legal and political analysis has been to 
identify the motives behind ECJ rulings, and to discover incentives which propel 
judicial co-operation between the ECJ and national courts. These studies usually 
present a model of judicial co-operation in which national courts play a leading 
role in European integration by providing the ECJ with frequent preliminary 
references.
This paper seeks to test the empirical validity of the traditional judicial co­
operation model through a case-study of British court activity since 1972. 
Political scientists frequently label Britain the "awkward partner" in the EC over 
a range of issues, noting in particular British scepticism of any development 
which deepens integration. This raises the central question addressed in this 
paper: whether British judicial activity in preliminary reference cases conforms 
to the traditional model or, rather, provides further evidence of British resistance 
to integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of 
the traditional model of judicial co-operation. The second section reviews ECJ 
instructions to national courts governing the preliminary reference procedure 
under Article 177. It will be suggested that this procedure, and adherence to 
ECJ interpretative methods by national courts, raises a number of previously
3See Joseph Weiler, "The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism," 1 
Yearbook o f European Law 267 (1981); Joseph Weiler, "Community, Membership and 
European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?" 21 Journal o f  Common Market Studies 39 
(1983); Joseph Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," 100 Yale Law Journal 2403 
(1991); Rasmussen (1986); Mary Volcansek, Judicial Politics in Europe (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1986); Martin Shapiro, "The European Court of Justice," in Alberta Sbragia, 
ed., Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the New European Community 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); Geoffrey Garrett, "International 
Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market," 46 
International Organisation 533 (1992); Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe 





























































































unexplored political questions. The third section contrasts British judicial 
traditions with the rules espoused by the ECJ. British interpretative methods will 
be discussed, as will British rules governing the Article 177 co-operation 
procedure. Section four presents comparative statistics on the use of Article 177 
in various EC member states. The traditional model of judicial co-operation is 
then tested against empirical evidence. Section five then tests the model on a 
microlevel by analysing a series of British cases in the field of environmental 
protection. These cases further illuminate the political issues inherent to the 
preliminary reference procedure. In light of the statistics and environmental 
cases, a substantial sixth section discusses the applicability of the traditional 
model to British judicial activity. It will be argued that constitutional tradition, 
domestic political pressures and psychological considerations condition British 
judicial activity, thereby attenuating the integrative impact of the ECJ. Such 
considerations should be incorporated into a refined model of judicial co­
operation.
The traditional model
It is vital to note that the traditional model of co-operation places significant 
emphasis specifically on the number of Article 177 references which the ECJ 
receives. This is distinct from a different form of co-operation which also 
contributes to European integration, namely the application of "sympathetic 
interpretation" by national courts to national legislation instead of making a 
preliminary reference. Through sympathetic interpretation, national courts 
exercise their interpretative discretion and employ a rule of construction which 
holds that whenever possible, national law should be read as not intending to 
conflict with Community law. Various authors have examined the role of 
sympathetic interpretation by UK courts in assimilating Community obligations 




























































































law.4 These authors usually survey a selection of diverse national cases in order 
to assess how receptive British courts are to ECJ doctrine.
But quite apart from sympathetic interpretation, the frequency of references 
provides an independent measure of the "partnership" between the ECJ and 
national courts. In his most recent discussion of courts and integration, Weiler 
goes out of his way to emphasise that each decision to refer to the ECJ 
strengthens the level of partnership. "When a national court seeks the Reference 
it is, with few exceptions, acknowledging that, at least at face value, Community 
norms are necessary and govern the dispute."5 The traditional model thus 
defines one crucial index of co-operation as the willingness of national courts to 
make frequent references under Article 177. The ECJ itself has recognised that 
preliminary references are "an index both of judicial co-operation between the 
Court of Justice and the national courts of the Member States and of the 
integration of Community law into national law."6
A number of authors, particularly Weiler, have suggested that judicial 
empowerment explains why national judges actively assist the ECJ in fostering 
integration.7 By supplying Article 177 references which the ECJ then uses as
4See Volcansek (1986); Amull (1989); Jackie Minor, "United Kingdom: Legislation and 
Case Law in Relation to the Country's EC-Membership," Assuntos Europeus 433 (1983); 
Aidan O'Neill, "The Government of Judges The Impact of the European Court of Justice on 
the Constitutional Order of the United Kingdom," EUI Working Paper, LAW No. 93/3
(1993) (Florence, EUI). Erika Szyszczak, "Current Survey," 19 European Law Review 214
(1994) .
5Joseph Weiler, "Journey to an Unknown Destination; A Retrospective and Prospective of the 
European Court of justice in the Arena of Political Integration," 31 Journal o f  Common 
Market Studies 417 (1993) at 422.
6Synopsis o f the Work o f  the Court o f Justice o f  the European Communities (Luxembourg: 
European Court of Justice, 1972), p. 16.
7Another obvious factor which explains judicial co-operation is that national courts are 
charged with upholding the law. Under the terms of the Treaty, as well as under the 
national legislation implementing the Treaty, rulings of the ECJ become authoritative 




























































































ammunition with which to advance European integration, the argument goes, 
national judges experience the personal self-aggrandisement which comes from 
directly participating in Community-building. In addition, by empowering the 
judicial branch, national judges take the opportunity to gain partial control over 
the other decisionmaking institutions—the Commission, Council, and indirectly 
over national governments themselves. Burley, for example, contends that the 
Court successfully convinced lower courts to "leapfrog the national judicial 
hierarchy and work directly with the ECJ."8 Other authors, including an ECJ 
Judge, agree that the ECJ required the co-operation of national courts and 
therefore appealed to their self-interests.9
ECJ rules for judicial co-operation: Article 177 references
While the Court relies heavily on member states to supply preliminary 
references, overuse of Article 177 could result in a flood of frivolous referrals.10 
In an effort to avoid a deluge of unnecessary referrals while simultaneously 
guaranteeing that Article 177 does not allow national courts sufficient 
interpretative latitude to circumvent preliminary references entirely, the ECJ has
judicial inertia from integrationist rulings in the highest courts of a few states made it 
progressively "more difficult for national courts to resist the trend with any modicum of 
credibility." The weight of judicial precedent accumulated, forcing even reluctant courts to 
accept ECJ doctrine. See Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," p. 2425. Nevertheless, 
as this paper will suggest, national judges retain substantial discretion to determine what the 
law actually requires and whether legal precedent exists. This discretion has enormous 
political significance.
8Burley, "Europe Before the Court," p.58.
9See G. Frederico Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," 26 Common Market 
Law Review 75 (1981); Volcansek (1986); Martin Shapiro, "The European Court of 
Justice," p.127.





























































































attempted to guide national judicial discretion inherent to the co-operative 
referral process.11
There are two situations in which a preliminary reference is not necessary. 
First, in cases where a national judge finds that a clear ECJ precedent exists on 
an interpretation of Community law. Second, when no precedent exists, but the 
correct application of Community law is so obvious that no reference is needed. 
The Court recognised that "the correct application of Community law may be so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which 
the question raised is to be resolved."12 In the second situation, therefore, the 
Court has attenuated the obligation of a national judge to make a preliminary 
reference with the acte clair doctrine: "if a provision is unequivocal there is no 
need to interpret it," and hence no need to refer to the ECJ.13
There is a distinct possibility that national judicial discretion arising under the 
two situations will undermine the uniform interpretation and application of 
Community law.14 If national judges employ their discretion and frequently find 
that ECJ precedent addresses the question of Community law and therefore no 
reference is required, the "total effect would be a disastrous reduction of the 
volume of the Court's docket; and, hence, a sizeable reduction in the Court's sole
1 iThe two leading cases which contain the Court's guidance for national judges are Da Costa 
en Schaake et al. v. Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie , Joined Cases 28-30/62 [1963] 
European Court Reports 31; CILFIT v. Ministry o f Health , Case 283/81 [1982] European 
Court Reports 3415. See Frederico Mancini and David Keeling, "From CILFIT to ERT: the 
Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court," 11 Yearbook o f European Law 1 
(1991).
12Para. 16 of CILFIT.
13Advocate General Capotorti in CILFIT. [1982] European Court Reports 3415, 3435.
14See Anthony Amull, "Reflections on Judicial Attitudes at the European Court," 34 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 168 (1985); Gerhard Bebr, "The Rambling 





























































































means of influence and control."15 Additionally, national judges might adopt a 
liberal interpretation of the acte clair doctrine in cases where no ECJ precedent 
exists, and take it upon themselves to decide a considerable number of questions 
concerning Community law.
The frequency of each of these scenarios might depend in part on the 
propensity of national judges to "strategically" withhold references. Refusal to 
refer could effectively circumvent what national judges consider undesirable ECJ 
doctrine by withholding from the ECJ the ability to return an unfavourable ruling. 
Judges may be inclined to claim that precedent exists, or that they are following 
acte clair, and interpret Community rules in their own way. Strategic use of this 
discretion provides an avenue for shaping EC law, and examples from British 
courts will be examined later in this paper. When a British court chooses to 
interpret by itself an EC directive instead of invoking Article 177, the ECJ is 
denied ammunition with which to foster EC integration. It is also denied the 
ability to impose a stringent interpretation of EC law.
Alternatively, the complexity of the acte clair doctrine might actually 
encourage national judges to make more Article 177 references.16 This 
possibility is made more likely if judges make strategic use of Article 177 in a 
manner opposite to the one discussed previously. If in fact a member state is 
dissatisfied with an ECJ precedent, frequent challenges to settled law, in the 
form of preliminary rulings, may be an effective recourse. It has been argued 
forcefully that German and French influence on the Court is a result of frequent
15Hjalte Rasmussen, "The European Court's Acte Clair Strategy in CILFIT," 9 European 
Law Review 242 (1984), p. 255.
16Ibid.; Some of the criteria established in CILFIT were described by Hodgson, J. as 
"intimidating to an English judge" in R. v. Secretary o f State fo r Transport, ex parte 
Factortame [1989] 2 Common Market Law Review 353. See also Derrick Wyatt and Alan 





























































































referrals in the early days of the Community.17 Although the discretion to make 
frequent referrals has always existed, acte clair almost encourages a deluge of 
references based on linguistic interpretation, ascertainment of Community 
objectives, and the proper evolution of Community law.
In sum, Article 177 allows national courts to test the bounds of Community 
law by requesting preliminary references. By using Article 177, British courts 
contest or influence the interpretation of EC directives. UK courts could also use 
preliminary references to challenge the Government's interpretation and 
implementation of EC directives.
British implementation of several environmental directives, particularly the 
bathing water directive, illustrates the political significance of this scenario. 
Initially, out of more than 600 British beaches, the Government designated only 
27 sites as UK bathing water areas under the terms of the 1976 Bathing Water 
Directive, with none in Scotland or Ireland. Not even Blackpool was listed as a 
bathing site. By comparison, France and Italy designated 3000 beaches. In 
order to justify its tiny number of designated bathing areas, the Government 
applied a questionable interpretation of key phrases such as where bathing "is 
tolerated," and even the definition of "bathing."
The trick was to define a bathing beach as one containing more 
than 1,000 people per kilometre of beach. The government then 
left it up to individual water authorities to decide how long a 
stretch of beach to measure at a time, when to count the bathers 
(would it be a wet Thursday in May or a sunny bank holiday in 
August?) and so on.18
17See P. Dagtaglou, "The English Judges and EC Law," 37 Cambridge Law Journal 76 
(1978). See also F. Mann, "Britain's Bill of Rights," 94 Law Quarterly Review 512 (1978).
18Fred Pearce, "Britain's Dirty Beaches," in Edward Goldsmith and Nicholas Flildyard, eds., 




























































































In 1993 the ECJ ruled in an Article 169 action that Britain's narrow interpretation 
of the directive, particularly its omission of Blackpool, violated EC law.19 If an 
opportunity had arisen, British preliminary references in this area might have 
facilitated stronger criticism from the Court and resulted in an adverse judgement 
much earlier than 1993.
Taken in a positive light, strategic use of Article 177 by national courts is a 
mechanism actively to influence the course of ECJ doctrine. Taken negatively, it 
is an attempt to frustrate or block development of unfavourable doctrines. The 
extent to which lower courts find it necessary to request a preliminary ruling is 
determined in part by the willingness and ability of national judges to 
approximate the judicial style of the ECJ. A brief exploration of ECJ judicial 
methods is therefore useful. The judicial style of British courts and their use of 
acte clair is then considered.
Teleological Interpretation
The main difference between UK and European judges is the understanding 
that European judges should fill gaps in legislation as opposed to leaving them 
for the legislature to amend. This can be done either by close textual analysis or 
teleological interpretation—a result follows either from the meaning of the words, 
or alternatively from the purpose of the statute. Due in part to the very nature of 
the Treaty and the central role given to the ECJ, a certain level of active judicial 
interpretation is expected. Lord Slynn admits that "for the ECJ, the teleological 
method frequently precedes and conditions the textual method of 
interpretation."20 This diagnosis was also supported by Ulrich Everling, another
19Case 56/90, 14 July 1993.
20Sir Gordon Slynn, "The Court of Justice of the European Communities," 33 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 409 (1984), p. 421. This concept is very similar to the 




























































































ECJ judge, when he noted that when answering preliminary rulings, "the reply to 
the abstract question framed by the court making the reference is not infrequently 
influenced by the result which the Court believes to be correct in the case..."21 
The teleological method underpinned early ECJ decisions leading to direct effect 
and primacy of EC law.22 More recently, similar interpretative techniques have 
been manifest in the Court's handling of human rights doctrine, as well as 
environmental policy. In each of these areas, the Court has achieved significant 
integrationist effects in part by applying an expansive treaty interpretation to 
questions referred by national courts under Article 177.23
21Ulrich Everling, "The Court of Justice as a Decisionmaking Authority," 82 Michigan Law 
Review 1294(1984), p. 1300.
22See Trevor Hartley, "Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: the Emerging Constitution of 
the European Community," 34 American Journal o f Comparative Law 229 (1986); For a 
discussion of how the Court proceeded despite objections by member states, see Eric Stein, 
"Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution," 75 American Journal 
o f International Law 1 (1981).
23On teleology and human rights, see Case 11/70 [1970] European Court Reports 125; Case 
4/73 [1974] European Court Reports 491; Case 44/79 [1979] European Court Reports 
3727. The literature on this point is both extensive and varied. See Henry Schermers, "The 
European Court of Justice: Promoter of European Integration," 22 American Journal o f 
Comparative Law 444 (1974); Michael Akehurst, "The Application of General Principles of 
Law by the Court of Justice of the EC," 52 British Yearbook o f International Law 29 
(1982); Manfred Dauses, "The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal 
Order," 10 European Law Review 398 (1985). For more recent accounts of human rights 
in the European Community, see Grainne De Burca, 'Fundamental Rights and the Reach of 
EC Law," 13 Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 283 (1993). The ECJ also played an 
important role in validating environmental measures which lacked specific treaty foundation. 
The Court's rulings applied teleological interpretation to the preamble, Article 100 and 
Article 235, but the crucial effect of its rulings was to validate the steady growth of EC 
environmental action programmes and directives which occurred prior to the Single 
European Act. The political consensus which was necessary to pass environmental 
directives was greatly strengthened by the Court's endorsement, and reluctant member states 
were left without effective legal recourse to policies which might have been outside the 
legitimate scope of the treaty. See Commission o f the EC  v. Italian Republic, Case 91/79 
[1980] European Court Reports 1099; Case 240/83 [1985] European Court Reports 531; 
Danish bottle case, Commission o f the EC v. Denmark, Case 302/86, 2 European 




























































































The rights which arise from Community legislation and which are applied 
through the new legal order entail restrictions on national sovereignty. National 
legislatures and executives are no longer entirely free to adopt policies, because 
they might contravene EC law. National judges are no longer entirely free to 
function within their own domestic legal context because ECJ precedent and 
methods constrain their decisions. The difficulty Britain faces reconciling its 
own legal order and conceptions of sovereignty with those of the Community is 
considered below.
British sovereignty and the role of the judiciary
The teleological approach endorsed by the Court appeared particularly 
unusual to British judges whose interpretative methods focus predominantly on 
close textual readings. When dealing with legislation, the traditional role of the 
British courts is to give effect faithfully to any and all acts of Parliament. The 
orthodox view of sovereignty restricts judicial discretion in order to avoid any 
diminution of legislative power.24 Parliament has solidified its own position by 
giving the courts very little to work with in terms of loose wording. Statutes are 
drafted narrowly, and are not principles that may easily be expanded upon.25 
British courts are never really given the chance to exercise teleological 
interpretation to the extent that was seen in ECJ cases. British judicial discretion 
is therefore limited to the different methods of literal interpretation and 
grammatical construction, although courts inevitably exercise a certain amount of
Justice," in J.D. Liefferink et al., eds., European Integration and Environmental Policy 
(London: Belhaven Press, 1993).
24See J. Mitchell, S. Kuipers and B. Gall, "Constitutional Aspects of the treaty and 
Legislation Relating to British Membership," 9 Common Market Law Review 134 (1972); 
Colin Turpin, British Government and the Constitution (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1985).




























































































discretion when interpreting a statute.26 There is no doubt that even the most 
liberal British interpretation of the proper judicial role would grant British judges 
far less discretion than exists for members of the ECJ.
The 1972 European Communities Act
The passing of the European Communities Act, which marked Britain's 
accession to the EC, raised fundamental questions about the future role of British 
courts and their relationship to Parliament. Section 2(1) of the European 
Communities Act provided that all directly applicable Community laws would be 
given direct effect in the UK without further Parliamentary action. Section 3(1) 
established the importance of the ECJ as the ultimate interpreter of the treaty, 
and mandated that UK courts follow ECJ rulings.
During the accession debates in the Commons, the Government frequently 
reiterated that membership would not erode parliamentary supremacy, nor would 
it fundamentally alter the traditional position of British courts within the British 
constitutional order. The Government needed to convince proponents of 
membership that Britain would fulfil its obligations as a member state, while 
simultaneously denying that membership entailed a wholesale abandonment of 
British constitutional tradition. The Solicitor General reassured opponents of 
membership by emphasising mechanisms which would guarantee Parliamentary 
supremacy.27 In the extreme case, "at the end of the day if repeal, lock, stock, 
and barrel, was proposed, the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament must remain
26When legislation is quite narrowly or poorly worded, or possibly unjust, the courts have 
employed principles of natural law and proportionality, and have avoided an overly strict 
construction of a statute. See Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1982); See also Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971). Taken too far, such activism risks judicial imperialism: "one man's rightly
straightened ruck in the texture of legislation may be another's improperly filled gap" 
(Marshall, Constitutional Theory , p. 89).




























































































intact."28 Short of this, he asserted, "the courts of this country would give effect 
to" future Parliamentary legislation which sought "expressly to exclude or 
override Community obligations."29 But without explicit wording, British courts 
would try to reconcile conflicting UK and EC legislation by interpreting UK 
statutes "in accordance with our international obligations. That is a clear 
convention of our constitution."30
Having entered the Community, Britain was bound by a copious body of EC 
legislation. British courts were charged with interpreting these Community laws 
to determine their effects on British citizens, and also with delimiting or ignoring 
them in the case of conflicting subsequent national legislation. Thus a major 
bulwark of sovereignty, short of repealing membership, was to be a judiciary 
faithful to Parliamentary will.
British Judicial Attitudes Towards Judicial Co-operation with the ECJ
It is obvious that for a national court to reconcile domestic and EC law 
requires an authoritative interpretation of EC law. We saw in section one how 
the ECJ has allowed national judges a certain degree of discretion when they 
encounter EC law; if ECJ precedent exists, or, under the acte clair doctrine, if 
the correct interpretation of EC law is obvious, they need not make a reference 
under Article 177. Otherwise, or if they want the European Court to reconsider 




30Ibid., p.1321. Sir Geoffrey Howe, then Solicitor General, outlined how this doctrine of 




























































































As far as Article 177 is concerned, until recently the leading British case was 
the 1974 Bulmer decision.31 After acknowledging that the House of Lords has 
to "bow down" to an ECJ ruling, and must refer the case for preliminary 
reference if an issue of interpretation arises, Lord Denning went on to strike at 
the assumptions of the acte clair doctrine. In terms of whether or not to make a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ, Denning was technically correct that in dealing 
with Article 177 "an English judge can say either 'I consider it necessary,' or 'I do 
not consider it necessary.' His discretion in that respect is final."32 But the spirit 
of ECJ rulings clearly shows that the discretion of trial courts should be used to 
further legal uniformity. Total discretion allows the possibility of strategic 
neglect of Article 177—abuse of acte clair. Denning left it unclear precisely 
when an English court should see the issue as "clear and free from doubt".33
Bulmer recognised that British and ECJ judges will often employ different 
methods of interpretation. As was mentioned earlier, the ECJ is comfortable 
giving meaning to vague and imprecise legislation or treaty provisions. Denning 
noted that in the UK such methods would be a "naked usurpation of legislative 
function...The gap must remain open until Parliament finds the time to fill it."34 
But Denning did not purport to defend British judicial techniques against the 
more activist methods adopted by the ECJ. Nor did he try to minimise the 
divergence between the two methods. His seminal instructions to English courts 
were as follows:
They must follow the European pattern. No longer must they 
examine the words in meticulous detail. No longer must they































































































argue about the precise grammatical sense. They must look to the 
purpose or intent...They must not confine themselves to the 
English text. They must consider, if need be, all the authentic 
texts, of which there are now eight...They must divine the spirit of 
the Treaty and gain inspiration from it. If they find a gap they 
must fill it as best they can. They must do what the framers of the 
instrument would have done if they had thought about it.35
Denning's ruling therefore contained contradictory instructions: British courts
should not apply teleological interpretation lest they undermine legislative
authority, but should follow the European example and apply the intent of the
law. In any case, Denning encouraged British courts to take matters into then-
own hands and to avoid preliminary references.
Whether this represents faithful adherence to the acte clair doctrine is open to 
debate. It is precisely the teleology exercised only at EC level which will 
maintain uniformity between member states. Otherwise acte clair becomes an 
effective way for courts to redefine treaty terms narrowly. Perhaps it is this very 
danger of fragmenting Community law that has brought criticism down upon 
Denning for implying that British Courts should exercise then discretion 
frequently and decide the issues themselves.
Lord Bingham has done much to address the questions left open by Denning. 
One of the most important cases since Bulmer was his 1983 decision in ApS 
Samex, which has since become accepted as the authoritative guide for British 
judges.36 Whereas Denning made it very clear that the initial question facing 
British courts, whether a decision on the question of Community law was 
necessary to enable judgement, was totally unhindered by ECJ doctrine, 
Bingham took a more European view of "necessity." Bingham appeared more 
willing to temper British discretion and defer to the ECJ's transnational wisdom.
35Ibid„ p. 216.





























































































[T]he court should have regard to the advantages enjoyed by the 
Court of Justice in having an overall view of the Community and 
its institutions, a detailed knowledge of the Treaties and of much 
of the subordinate legislation made under them, and an intimate 
familiarity with functioning of the Community which a national 
judge denied the collective experience of the Court of Justice 
could not hope to achieve.37
Bingham went so far as to conclude that even if a British judge's interpretation is 
clear and free from doubt, a reference may be needed because "it has emerged in 
some past cases that, even where questions have been considered by national 
courts to be clearly answerable in one sense, they have ultimately been answered 
by the Court of Justice in another way."38
One final point in ApS Samex regards Denning's landmark instruction to 
engage in gap filling and ECJ interpretative methods. This crucial divergence 
from standard British practice sat uneasily with Bingham, who again hailed the 
ECJ as the proper repository of such methods.
Sitting as a judge on a national court, asked to decide questions of 
Community law, I am very conscious of the advantages enjoyed 
by the Court of Justice, It has a panoramic view of the 
Community and its institutions...When comparison falls to be 
made between Community texts in different languages, all texts 
being equally authentic, the multinational Court of Justice is 
equipped to carry out the task in a way which no national judge, 
whatever his linguistic skills, could rival. The interpretation of 
Community instruments involves very often not the process 
familiar to common lawyers of laboriously extracting the meaning 
from words used but the more creative process of supplying flesh 
to a spare and loosely constructed skeleton. The choice between 






























































































considerations, but on a broader view of what the orderly 
development of the Community requires.39
This is a stark contrast to Denning's admonitions, and admonishes British judges
to make frequent preliminary references.
If we recall the ability of national courts to hasten or hinder EC integration 
through their use of Article 177 and acte clair, the significance of these two 
cases becomes clear. The manner in which national judges exercise their 
discretion, and the interpretative methods they decide to employ will each affect 
the pace and effectiveness of integration. The following section therefore 
examines how British courts have exercised their discretion under Article 177. 
Based on Bulmer we would expect relatively few references from Britain 
because English judges would do the interpreting themselves, although we 
would expect to see more frequent British preliminary references after the 1983 
instructions in ApS Samex.
Comparative Article 177 activity in EC member states
As this section will reveal, the frequency of preliminary references varies 
amongst member states. On the face of the statistics presented below, it would 
appear that for many years Britain distinguished itself as a nation loathe to 
provide preliminary references, and therefore loathe to engage in judicial co­
operation with the ECJ.40 The traditional model of judicial co-operation fails to 
explain these statistics.
39Ibid., p. 1055.
^S om e figures are from Synopsis o f the Work o f  the Court o f  Justice o f  the European 
Communities (Luxembourg: European Court of Justice, annual vols. 1972-1983 and 1990, 
biannual vols. 1984-1989), others were provided by the Court's Legal Data Processing 
Service. For earlier compilations, see K. Mortelmans, "The Role of Government 
Representatives in the Proceedings: Statistical Data on the Observations of the Member 
States in Preliminary Proceedings," in Henry Schermers, Christian Timmermans, Alfred 
Kellermann and J. Watson, eds., Article 177 EEC: Experiences and Problems (The Hague: 




























































































FIGURE 1. PRELIMINARY REFERENCES: 1972-1993
72 73 74 IS 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 Total t l 972-1983)
Belgium 4 8 5 7 11 16 7 13 14 12 10 9 116
Denmark - 0 - 1 - 1 3 1 2 1 1 4 14
France 1 4 6 15 8 14 12 18 14 17 39 15 163
Germany 20 37 14 26 28 30 46 33 24 41 36 36 371
Ireland - 0 - 0 1 2 1 2 3 0 0 2 11
Italy 4 5 4 14 12 7 11 19 19 12 18 7 132
Luxembourg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 7
Netherlands 11 6 6 4 14 9 38 11 17 17 21 19 173
UK - 0 1 1 1 5 5 8 6 5 4 6 42
Total 40 61 36 69 75 84 123 106 99 109 12998 1029
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 .22 Total d  984-19931
Belgium 13 13 13 15 32 13 17 19 16 22 173
Denmark 2 0 4 5 4 2 5 2 3 7 34
France 34 45 19 36 37 28 21 29 15 22 286
Germany 38 40 18 32 34 47 34 54 62 57 416
Ireland 1 2 4 4 0 1 4 2 0 1 19
Italy 10 11 5 5 28 10 25 36 22 24 176
Luxembourg 0 6 1 3 2 1 4 2 1 1 21
Netherlands 22 14 16 19 25 18 9 17 17 43 200
UK 9 8 8 9 16 14 12 14 18 12 120
Total 129 139 88 128 178 134 131 175 154 189 1445
Source: Synopsis o f the Work o f the Court o f Justice
With only 42 references from 1972-1983, British courts lagged well behind those 
of other large EC states. Courts in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
even Belgium requested three times as many preliminary references from the 
ECJ as did British courts. After 1983, the total number of references from 
British courts continued to lag behind those of other EC states, but increased 
from previous years and also relative to all other large member states. This 
would seem to indicate a particularly low level of judicial co-operation between 




























































































originating in British courts offered the ECJ minimal opportunity to foster 
integration. By making more frequent use of preliminary references, judges in 
other member states were apparently more willing to follow whatever legal 
interpretation the ECJ handed down. However, there does appear to be a 
noticeable increase in the number of British Article 177 references after 1983, 
particularly in the late 1980s, in accordance with the post-Bulmer doctrine of 
ApS Samex, discussed in the previous section. Bingham's instructions to British 
judges, that they defer to ECJ judgement, appear to have generated more 
references, particularly in the late 1980s.
But the total number of references is only one measure of judicial co­
operation. The small number of references from British courts is explained in 
part by the fact that, compared to courts in other member states, British judges 
rarely encounter questions of EC law. The following table reveals that, from 
1972-1993, British courts decided questions of EC law, with or without referring 
them to the ECJ, approximately half as often as did foreign courts in other large 
EC states, and even less frequently than courts in Belgium. The low incidence of 
EC legal questions may provide further indication of a lack of judicial co­




























































































FIGURE 2. DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS ON 
QUESTIONS OF EC LAW
Total National Decisions on Total National Decisions on 











Source: Synopsis o f  the Work o f the Court o f  Justice
However, conclusions based solely on the total number of preliminary 
references or the number of EC legal questions might reflect a statistical artifact. 
Disparities in these totals could possibly be explained by structural differences, 
between common law and civil law legal systems, for example, or between 
adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems. These structural features vary 
amongst European judicial systems. Combining the previous two tables provides 
the most revealing measure of judicial co-operation. The following table 




























































































FIGURE 3. PROPORTION OF EC LAW QUESTIONS 







21% (116/557) 28% (173/622)
44% (14/32) 54% (34/63)
31% (163/525) 28% (286/1496)
26% (371/1429) 29% (416/2205)






29% (132/452) 16% (176/1074)
20% (7/35) 30% (21/69)
31% (173/563) 14% (200/1471)
20% (42/215) 21% (120/569)
27% (1029/3830) 19% (1445/7657)
These numbers capture several trends in British judicial behaviour and confirm 
preliminary observations based on Figures 1 and 2. Until the early 1980s, British 
judges were significantly less inclined to make preliminary references to the ECJ 
than were judges in other member states, referring in only 20% of cases, 
compared with an EC average of 27%. In fact, along with courts in Luxembourg 
and Belgium, British courts demonstrated the lowest level of judicial co­
operation with the ECJ during the period 1972-1983.
A different picture of judicial co-operation emerged during the 1980s. The 
proportion of EC legal questions referred by British judges remained basically 
constant from 1984-1993, a period when, for whatever reasons, courts in several 
other large member states drastically curtailed the proportion of cases they 
referred to the ECJ and the average refereeal rate fell from 27 percent to 19 
percent. During this period, British courts referred to the ECJ in 21% of cases 
dealing with EC law, which more than equalled the average level of judicial co­
operation throughout the Community and far surpassed levels found in Italy and 
the Netherlands. The stability in the UK referral rate during this period of 
relative national judicial insularity appears to support the prediction made earlier 




























































































British judges, as ApS Samex altered the behaviour of British judges and their 
exercise of discretion under Article 177.
The traditional model of judicial co-operation fails to account for such 
national disparities in the number of cases dealing with EC law, the number of 
Article 177 references, or the proportion of cases referred to the ECJ. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the traditional model holds that the 
number of references is a crucial indicator of the partnership between national 
courts and the ECJ. At no point does the model predict that the extent of this 
partnership will vary so considerably amongst member states. This alone is a 
significant finding which warrants reconsideration of the model. In an attempt to 
uncover some of the variables which might refine the model and provide a more 
complete explanation for judicial behaviour, the following section examines a 
series of British cases in the field of environmental protection which each 
contained questions of Community law. The behaviour of British judges in these 
cases highlights the political significance of judicial discretion as well as the 
variety of competing pressures which any model must consider.'!!
EC environmental cases in British courts
Despite the rapid expansion of EC environmental policy since its inception in 
1972, there has been only a small handful of British cases dealing with EC 
environmental law, and only in very recent years. In these few instances, British 
judges have consistently invoked the acte clair doctrine and interpreted 
environmental directives themselves. 41
41 Other authors have looked at UK courts handling of remedies in some of these cases but 
not the propensity of judges to make preliminary references. See Angela Ward, "The Right 
to an Effective Remedy in European Law and Environmental Protection: A Case Study of 
United Kingdom judicial Decisions Concerning the Environmental Assessment Directive," 5 





























































































In July 1991, the House of Lords delivered its opinion in Regina v. London 
Boroughs Transport Committee, a case dealing with traffic noise.42 A night ban 
on lorry traffic in London had been adopted in order to reduce noise pollution. 
Exceptions to the ban were granted only for lorries fitted with a special device 
which silenced their air brakes. EC Directives 71/320 and 70/157 established 
manufacturing standards for braking devices and sound levels for exhaust 
systems, each directive specifying that no state might prevent the use of a vehicle 
on grounds relating to its braking devices, permissible sound level, or exhaust 
system if the vehicle complied with both directives. The Divisional Court and 
the Court of Appeal held unanimously that the night ban violated the two EC 
directives.
The House of Lords examined the night ban and found that lorries were in 
fact not being prohibited on grounds relating to their braking devices, sound level 
or exhaust system. Instead, the Lords interpreted the prohibition narrowly, as 
regulating traffic and protecting the environment by "banning some vehicles 
which are unnecessarily louder than others."43 In order to reach this judgement, 
the Lords characterised both directives as measures having nothing to do with 
brake noise or traffic regulation.44 Nevertheless, the EC directives contained the 
explicit provisions that
No member state may refuse or prohibit the...use of a vehicle on 
grounds relating to its braking devices if that vehicle is equipped 
with the braking devices specified [in the Directive].
42[1992] 1 Common Market Law Reports 5. [Brake Noise Case]
43Ibid., p. 16.
44"The Brake Directive has got nothing to do with sound levels and is not concerned with 
traffic regulation" (Ibid., p. 14). "The Sound Level Directive does not deal with the sound 




























































































No member state may, on grounds relating to the permissible 
sound level and the exhaust system, refuse the...use of any vehicle 
in which the sound level and the exhaust system satisfy [the 
Directive].
The Lords held that vehicle noise was calculated without any regard to brake 
noise, and therefore the prohibition on lorries was a matter of traffic regulation 
not covered by the directive. Furthermore, the Lords contended that no one 
reading the Brake Directive would be made aware that air brakes produced any 
noise at all, and that the directive therefore did not invalidate the lorry ban.
The Lords might have referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on 
the interpretation of the two directives. The likelihood of a referral was 
increased by the fact that the House of Lords is a court of final instance from 
which there is no appeal. ECJ doctrine specifies that such courts have a greater 
obligation to refer matters to the Court than do lower national tribunals. In the 
event, the Lords chose not to refer the matter to the ECJ, ruling instead that
The difference between traffic control in urban residential areas 
for environmental purposes and the Community unification of 
manufacturing standards for motor vehicles is so obvious that 
regulation of the former can be held not to infringe the latter 
without a necessary question of Community law arising (even if a 
unanimous Court of Appeal has held the opposite) and 
consequently a compulsory reference under Article 177 (3) EEC is 
not required.45
The lower courts did not refer the case to the ECJ but interpreted ECJ precedent 
and EC laws themselves to arrive at a decision. The Lords decision criticised 
their interpretation of EC law.
Since the Court of Appeal did not appreciate the fundamental 
distinction between the control of vehicles and the regulation of 





























































































Community law...No plausible grounds have been advanced for a 
reference to the European Court of Justice.46
The Brake Noise Case presents an example of British courts applying the acte
clair doctrine to interpret EC law in favour of environmental protection.
One important pressure operating on the Lords might have been a desire to 
uphold traditional British environmental interests. The inclination to reduce noise 
pollution has been a consistent feature of British environmental policy, and 
represents one of the few areas where the UK can be called progressive. 
Directive 70/157, the Sound Level Directive under consideration in the case, was 
adopted before Britain had joined the Community, but actually allowed 
relaxation of British standards for lorry noise because existing UK noise 
regulations were more stringent than the directive. In addition, the British 
official at UKREP responsible for negotiating environmental directives from 
1984-89, cited British pressure as the primary force behind the motor cycle noise 
directive, and claimed that reducing noise pollution has always been a significant 
British objective.47 For example, Britain was the only EC member to develop a 
prototype of a quiet heavy vehicle in the early 1970s.48
There have also been three recent cases where the effect of British judges 
refusing to make preliminary references to the ECJ has been to restrict 
environmental protection. Each case dealt with the 1985 Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive. The political significance of this directive is enormous. It 
could potentially restrict major national development projects, amounting to 
millions of pounds, as well as impose environmental restrictions on transport 
policy, agricultural policy and energy policy.
46Brake Noise Case, p. 21.
47Interview, 15 January 1993.
48See Nigel Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy and Britain (London, Institute for European 





























































































In the 1990 case of Swale, the High Court considered whether the Medways 
Port Authority should have been granted permission to reclaim a 250 acre 
mudflat which was important to migrating birds, without having undertaken an 
environmental impact assessment.49 The Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds challenged the planning permission on the grounds that the reclamation 
constituted a project with significant environmental effects, which requires 
environmental impact assessment under the terms of the directive. Mr. Justice 
Simon Brown refused to overturn the planning permission, finding no violation of 
EC law. His decision addressed two aspects of local planning authority 
discretion which might have been referred to the ECJ.
The first act of planning authority discretion would be to classify a 
development project under Schedule 1, Schedule 2, or outside the bounds of the 
directive. Schedule 1 projects face mandatory assessment, Schedule 2 projects 
require assessment only if they are likely to have significant effects on the 
environment by virtue of their nature, size or location. The directive allows 
member states some discretion, demanding assessment of Schedule 2 projects 
only where member states consider that their characteristics so require.
Thus there are two discretionary choices open to the planning authority— 
whether a project falls under either Schedule, and, assuming it falls under 
Schedule 2, whether the project is likely to have significant effects on the 
environment. British legislation to implement the directive allows a case-by-case 
determination of the likely impacts and predicts that "the number of projects 
[with significant effects] will be a small proportion of all Schedule 2 projects."50
49/? v. Swale ex Parte Royal Society fo r  the Protection o f Birds, 1990 Crown Office Report 
263.
50In addition to the Town and Country Planning Regulations 1988, British implementation 
has taken the form of Circulars. Circular 15/88 sets out criteria which apply in determining 




























































































In Swale, the RSPB contended that the planning authority abused both elements 
of its initial discretionary decision.
Mr. Justice Brown allowed the Swale Borough Council the widest possible 
discretion in meeting the requirements of the directive. The High Court held that 
"on the information before it, the Council was entitled to regard this development 
as falling outside either Schedule."51 Even if this had not been the case, and the 
project had fallen within Schedule 2, Mr. Justice Brown refused to impinge upon 
the discretion of the planning authority to apply whatever criteria it saw fit to 
determine significant environmental effects. He ruled that "even if they had 
categorised it as being prime facie within Schedule 2, they could not be faulted 
for concluding that it would not have a significant environmental effect." This 
ruling accords with the usual British legal test applied to discretion exercised by 
administrative bodies, whereby a decision is upheld unless no "reasonable 
person" could possibly reach such a conclusion. Mr. Justice Brown apparently 
felt that the environmental sensitivity of a reasonable person was not a matter for 
reference to the ECJ. Similarly, the High Court chose not to ask the ECJ 
whether the directive allowed the level of discretion given by UK legislation and 
Circulars.
A second discretionary decision left to the planning authority when applying 
criteria for Schedule 2 is the definition of a "project." Clearly the nature and size 
of a development project depends on how one defines the project. A motorway, 
for example, might be considered one enormous project requiring assessment, or 
may be considered the sum of many tiny projects whose individual
thresholds, but emphasises the importance of a case-by-case determination. See David 
Anderson, "Environmental Impact Assessment in the United Kingdom," in David Vaughan, 
ed., Current Legal Developments: EC Environmental and Planning Law (London: 
Butterworth's, 1991).




























































































environmental impact is negligible. Government Circular 15/88 included a 
numerical threshold which could answer this exact question.
New Roads: environmental assessment may be required for new 
roads or major road improvements more than 10km in length, or 
lkm if the road passes through a national park or within 100m of a 
SSSI, national nature reserve or conservation area.
In Swale, Mr. Justice Brown addressed the question of whether planning
authorities had unlimited discretion to permit piecemeal development projects,
ruling that
in respect of Schedule 2 development, the question whether it 
would be likely to have significant effects on the environment 
should not be considered in isolation if in reality it was properly to 
be regarded as an integral part of an inevitably more substantial 
development. Otherwise, developers could defeat the objective of 
the regulations by piecemeal development proposals.52
While Mr. Justice Brown clearly recognised that piecemeal development
circumvents the goals of the directive, he did not deny that discretion to measure
the impact of such projects, and the subsequent ability to grant planning
permission, resides with the planning authority and is subject to few, if any,
restrictions. Anderson, in his critique of the Swale case, interprets the Brown
decision as allowing assessment of individual projects quite apart from the larger
development contemplated beyond them.53 Mr. Justice Brown apparently chose
not to refer the meaning of "project" to the ECJ in a preliminary reference. By
making the interpretation himself, Mr. Justice Brown opened the door to
enormous piecemeal development projects immune from environmental
assessment.
52r/ie Times, 11 April 1990, p. 40




























































































The legitimate discretion of a planning authority was also questioned in the 
1991 case of R v. Poole Borough Council,54 The Council did not even consider 
undertaking an environmental assessment for a housing development, at which 
point the World Wildlife Fund and the British Herpetological Society sought an 
injunction. As was the case in Swale, the development project could have been 
classed under Schedule 2, at which point the Council would have had to 
determine whether it posed significant effects for the environment. Circular 
15/88 notes that industrial estates where the area exceeds 50 acres or where 
there are more than 1,000 dwellings within 200 meters of the site boundaries 
may require environmental assessment. Not only did the Council not consider 
the housing estate in question large enough to merit assessment, but they did not 
even classify the scheme as a benign Schedule 2 project.
Mr. Justice Schiemann ruled that the WWF and the BHS had no legal ability 
to initiate the EIA process if the Council had, acting upon its discretion, failed to 
do so. This ruling upholds an even wider discretion for planning authorities than 
was given in Swale. Not only did the Poole Council have the ability to classify a 
project outside the scope of either Schedule, but they had the power to authorise 
a development project without even contemplating the applicability of the EC 
environmental impact directive. Given that the case is distinguishable from 
Swale on these grounds, Mr. Justice Schiemann might have referred the question 
of discretion to the ECJ. The Poole case upheld the practically unfettered 
discretion of planning authorities without referring the matter to the European 
Court.
The most striking British example of acte clair occurred in the now famous 
1990 Twyford Down case.55 In March 1990, the Secretary of State for
S^Land Management and Environmental Law Review April/May 1991, p. 60.
55Twyford Parish Council v. Secretary o f State fo r  the Environment [1992] 1 Common 




























































































Transport proposed a scheme to construct a motorway which would cut through 
Twyford Down. Three parish councils questioned the validity of the scheme and 
applied to the court to quash the project on grounds that the Secretary of State 
for Transport failed to make an environmental impact assessment of the project 
and to give the public an opportunity to express an opinion thereon.
The central contention presented by the parish councils was that the directive 
applied to projects which had been published but not yet initiated by the date the 
directive took force. Such projects might conveniently be regarded as being "in 
the pipeline." Mr. Justice McCullough recognised that the question before the 
court was a matter of interpreting EC law:
The answer to the question of whether or not pipeline projects 
were intended to be covered by the directive is not to be found by 
balancing the advantages and disadvantages of one construction or 
the other or by considering the possible, or even the practicable.
The essential question is: what was the result which [Directive] 
85/337 required to be achieved by 3 July 1988, and the answer 
must come from the terms of the directive itself.56
Nevertheless, he refused to refer the question to the ECJ, the obvious arbiter for
interpretation of EC law. Mr. Justice McCullough stated the compelling reason
to refer the case—uniformity of EC law—but chose to jeopardise uniformity by
withholding a reference.
National judges must remember that the interpretation of 
Community legislation is all too apt to involve difficulties of which 
they may be unaware. A provision cannot be interpreted 
differently in different member states. Nevertheless /  have 
decided to try to answer it. * 57





























































































After dismissing the importance of a definitive ECJ ruling, he held that the 
directive did not apply to pipeline projects because such projects were not 
explicitly mentioned in the directive.
Certainly the text of the directive allows such an interpretation, and Mr. 
Justice McCullough recounted numerous provisions which might demonstrate 
that once an assessment has been partially completed under national rules it 
would be cumbersome to reassess the entire project under EC guidelines. Of 
course there is no explicit statement in the directive that a cumbersome 
reassessment is not required, nor are there guidelines by which a national court 
might measure the actual burden, if any, of reassessment. Mr. Justice 
McCullough played up the fear of cumbersome reassessment as if substantial 
technical detail would have to be re-examined. In fact, initial stages of 
assessment may have involved very little effort on the part of the developer, as 
Mr. Justice McCullough admits.58 Several possible preliminary references might 
have been made in this case, but Mr. Justice McCullough chose to interpret the 
directive narrowly, maximising the discretion of developers and planning 
authorities.
In fact, British interpretation of the EIA-granting almost unlimited discretion 
to planning authorities and ignoring pipeline projects-has already been 
challenged by the Commission. In October 1991, the Commission demanded 
that Britain halt several development projects on the grounds that inadequate 
environmental assessment had been applied.59 Although the Commission 
explicitly indicted the Government and not the British courts, the broad national 
discretion which constituted the violation of the EIA was as much a product of 
British judicial interpretation as legislative intent. UK legislation might have
58Ibid., p. 277.
59The Daily Telegraph, 18 October 1991; The Independent, 19 October 1991; The 




























































































been interpreted in several different ways, only one of which condoned the broad 
discretion of planning authorities and exempted pipeline projects.
The decision by British judges to withhold references from the ECJ in cases 
where the discretion of planning authority was involved might reflect domestic 
political objectives similar to those in noise pollution cases. Whereas in noise 
pollution cases preliminary references might have allowed the ECJ to interpret 
EC law contrary to stringent British standards, in the planning authority cases an 
ECJ preliminary ruling could possibly result in much stricter environmental 
assessment than that found in British practice. During the 1980s, deregulation of 
development projects was a primary objective of the British Government, 
reflecting Thatcher's ffee-market ideology.60 Throughout the development of the 
EIA directive, Britain resisted what it saw as unnecessary environmental 
regulation, securing several amendments to the final version of the directive 
which accorded with perceived British interests.61 Thus it is not entirely 
surprising that British judges exercised their discretion in a manner consistent 
with British hostility towards regulation, as opposed to allowing the ECJ to 
tighten regulations through a series of preliminary rulings.
Towards a refined model of judicial co-operation
The traditional model of judicial co-operation advanced by Weiler and others 
holds that national courts work closely with the ECJ in order to foster European 
integration. The model postulates that judicial empowerment provides the
60See Philip Lowe and Andrew Flynn, "Environmental Politics and Policy in the 1980s," in 
John Mohan, ed., The Political Geography o f  Contemporary Britain (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1989); Andrew Blowers, 'Transition or Transformation?—Environmental Policy 
Under Thatcher," 65 Public Administration 277 (1987).
61See William Sheate and Richard Macrory, "Agriculture and the EC Environmental 
Assessment Directive: Lessons for Community Policy-Making," 28 Journal o f Common 
Market Studies 68 (1989); Nigel Haigh, "Environmental Assessment-The EC Directive," 




























































































incentive for such co-operation. For the most part, evidence from the tables in 
section three which summarise the pattern of references from British courts does 
not accord with the predictions made by proponents of the traditional model.
From the moment Britain entered the Community, the number of preliminary 
references originating from British courts lagged far behind that from other 
member states. Thus judicial empowerment appears to have played little or no 
part in encouraging wide or enthusiastic use of Article 177 by British judges. 
While authors have also found that British courts were generally not co-operative 
with the ECJ prior to the mid-1980s, their conclusions were based on analysis of 
sympathetic interpretation as an indicator of co-operation rather than isolating the 
overall referral rate.62
Just as the traditional model fails to explain British judicial activity from 
1972-1983, it also fails to account for changing patterns of judicial behaviour in 
subsequent years. According to the statistics for the period 1984-1992, which 
occurred after the seminal ApS Samex ruling, British judges did in fact make 
relatively more preliminary references than before, and referred a higher 
proportion of the cases involving EC law. Each of these developments indicate a 
greater propensity to engage in judicial co-operation with the ECJ.63 
Nevertheless, the substantial gap between British referrals and foreign referrals, 
although slightly smaller than in previous years, still remained. Moreover, 
similar disparities remained between Britain and other member states regarding
62See Volcansek (1986).
63This change of attitude is reflected in the literature. Writing in 1983, observers claimed that 
British judges had refused to embrace ECJ doctrine and methods. By 1991, however, this 
sceptical view of British courts had been revised after a steady progression of cases which 
acknowledged the authority of the ECJ and of EC law. Compare D.N. Clarke and B.E 
Sufrin, "Constitutional Conundrums. The Impact of the United Kingdom's Membership of 
the Communities on Constitutional Theory," in M.P. Furmston et al., eds., The Effect on 
English Domestic Law o f Membership o f the European Communities and o f Ratification o f  
the European Convention on Human Rights (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1983) and Paul Craig, 




























































































the number of EC legal questions arising in national courts. Thus if one takes all 
the indicators together, at no point has British judicial co-operation with the ECJ 
reached the same level as that found in other large member states. This finding 
contrasts sharply with other studies which conclude that British courts 
"demonstrated whole-hearted compliance with the obligations imposed by 
Article 177 of the Treaty."64
The traditional model also fails to account for evidence at the microlevel 
drawn from the environmental sector. Given the slight upturn in the total number 
of British preliminary references, the evidence seems to show that British 
resistance to preliminary references is stronger in environmental cases than in 
general. All the environmental cases discussed above occurred after Lord 
Bingham's decision in ApS Samex which encouraged British judges to make 
more referrals than they would have done under Lord Denning's previous ruling 
in Bulmer. Nevertheless, British courts show no inclination whatsoever to refer 
environmental cases to the ECJ for preliminary rulings, which raises the 
interesting question whether the tendency of British judges to interpret EC law 
themselves is particularly strong in environmental cases, and indicates the need 
to refine the model in order to explain cases in individual policy sectors. There 
has not yet been an attempt to conduct an examination of British 177 references 
in other policy sectors. Rather, authors analyse only a scattering of cases where 
Article 177 might have been used. Two sectors of particular interest might be 
sex discrimination and Sunday trading. In addition, recent analysis has focused 
almost exclusively on sympathetic interpretation of national laws and the rights 
of British citizens to effective remedy for breach of EC law. The remainder of 
this paper will suggest a variety of factors which might help illuminate British 
judicial activity. A number of these factors could serve to refine the traditional 
model of judicial co-operation.




























































































One factor which might explain disparities between the number of national 
preliminary references is national political culture and the expected role of the 
courts. It might be the case that British judges viewed empowerment as an 
illegitimate deviation from their traditional role within the UK constitutional 
system which emphasises Parliamentary supremacy and limited judicial review. 
With a traditional deference to representative branches of government, British 
judges might not have recognised the opportunity for empowerment until 
recently, or may have seen such empowerment as inappropriate.
Another relevant aspect of political culture might be that the inclination of 
British judges to exercise their acte clair discretion more than foreign judges 
stems from a general hostility to the "new legal order"; in essence, a further 
example of British resistance to Community integration. The figures above 
support other accounts of "strategic" use of acte clair by British courts.65 In 
line with this possibility, evidence that British courts fail to apply EC directives 
and treat claims of UK non-compliance with hostility was presented to the House 
of Lords in 1991.66 It was mentioned in section one that strategic use of judicial 
discretion could take the form of withholding references, or alternatively, 
flooding the Court with references in order to influence the direction of EC legal 
development, as was the practice of German and French courts in the early years 
of the Community. If Euro-scepticism has been a factor in British co-operation 
with the ECJ, the pattern has been to strategically withhold references rather than 
attempt to alter the course of integration through frequent referrals.
The slight increase in the number of British preliminary references since ApS 
Samex might reflect a lifting of Euro-scepticism in recent years within judicial 
ranks. Since the late 1980s British courts have demonstrated greater willingness
65Amull, "The Use and Abuse," p. 631-637.




























































































to embrace the direct effect and primacy of EC law.67 This raises the interesting 
possibility that British courts moved gradually towards greater judicial co­
operation with the ECJ despite a general political climate of Euro-pessimism—it 
should not be forgotten that during the 1980s the Government treated European 
integration with open hostility. Alternatively, the fact that the level of British 
judicial co-operation, measured by the total number of questions involving EC 
law or the total number of preliminary references, continued to lag behind the 
level of judicial co-operation in other member states might reflect a connection 
between the general political climate and the attitude of British judges.
That political culture shapes the interaction between British courts and the 
ECJ is not entirely surprising. A similar politicisation of interaction is clearly 
evident in the Government's active involvement in ECJ cases. Community legal 
procedure allows any member state to submit written or oral arguments 
whenever the member state so desires. This applies to domestic as well as 
foreign Article 177 references. The following table summarises the total number 
of observations made by member states in both domestic and foreign Article 177 
cases.
67See Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1989] Common Market law 
Review 194; Pickstone v Freemans pic [1989] AC 66; Factortame Ltd v Secretary o f  State 
fo r Transport [1990] 2 AC 85; Factortame Ltd v Secretary o f State fo r Transport (No. 2) 
[1991] AW England Law Reports 70. See Paul Craig, "Sovereignty of the United Kingdom 




























































































FIGURE 4. ARTICLE 177 JUDGEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT 
OBSERVATIONS: 1973-1992
Domestic Cases Foreign Cases
References Observations O/R (%) References Observations O/R (%)
Belgium 192 61 32 1388 39 3
Denmark 33 17 52 1547 70 5
Germany 539 136 25 1041 107 10
Greece 9 4 44 1571 19 1
France 239 141 59 1341 120 9
Ireland 23 10 43 1557 24 2
Italy 163 125 77 1417 184 13
Luxembourg 19 12 63 1561 6 <1
Netherlands 245 146 60 1335 73 5
Spain 10 6 60 1570 29 2
Portugal 4 4 100 1576 17 1
UK 104 88 85 1476 213 14
Total 1580 750 47 17380 901 5
Example: Of the 1580 Article 177 judgements given by the ECJ during 1973- 
1992, 104 originated in British courts. The British government submitted 
observations in 88 out of these 104 cases-85% of the time. Of the 1476 
Article 177 judgements which originated in foreign courts, the British 
government submitted observations in 213—14% of the time.
Source: European Court of Justice, Legal Data Processing Service
The attitude of the Government is clearly identifiable. The percentage of 
references where the Government filed observations is significantly higher than 
average, exceeding all other member states except Portugal, where the number of 
cases arising was almost negligible. In foreign cases, Britain has proven more 
willing than any other member state to try to influence the ECJ. From 1973- 
1992 there were a total of 1476 references which originated from courts outside 
the UK. Britain intervened in 213 of these cases, far exceeding the number of 
observations made by any other member state.68 Clearly the Government is
68Everling concludes that "the figures thus reveal a trend for precisely those member states 
which are wary of supranational concepts to take part frequently in preliminary ruling cases 




























































































sensitive to the significance of Article 177 references, and takes every 
opportunity to influence their outcome.69 The above figures attest to the 
interventionist attitude which clearly prevails with those responsible for 
submitting observations.70
The Government's decision to frequently intervene highlights the second of 
the two approaches to discretion mentioned in section one—that resistance to EC 
integration and the new legal order does not necessarily entail a minimal level of 
interaction between national and Community institutions. Rather than avoid 
interaction, the Government showed extreme sensitivity to the power wielded by 
the ECJ and sought to influence its rulings by frequently intervening in Article 
177 cases.
In addition to the political pressures discussed above, another factor which 
could refine the existing model of judicial co-operation is the possibility that 
British judges are frustrated with replies they have received from the ECJ in 
previous preliminary references. Toth observes that "English courts and 
tribunals are (perhaps justifiably) disappointed with some of the preliminary 
rulings they received in the equal pay and equal treatment cases."71 He 
recommends that
States of the European Community Before Their Court of Justice," 9 European Law Review 
215 (1984), p.225.
69An Assistant Treasury Solicitor responsible for British written and oral observations to the 
Court was able to claim in 1985 that "I do not know of a case where we have failed to 
submit written observations in time in a case where we had decided that we should submit 
observations." See R.N. Ricks, "Article 177 References: The United Kingdom Experience," 
in Schermers et al., Article 177 EEC , p. 255.
70For a contrasting view, see Claus Gulmann, "Methods of Interpretation of the European 
Court of Justice, Scandinavian Studies in Law 187 (1980). Writing in 1980, Gulmann, 
Legal Secretary to the ECJ from 1973-76, claimed that observations were not used 
strategically to influence the Court.




























































































surely the answer lies not in refraining from referring similar future 
cases but, on the contrary, in referring and referring again, until 
the Court is made aware of the existence of a real problem and is 
virtually forced to give a relevant answer.72
This advice, reminiscent of French and German judicial activity in the early days
of the Community, overlooks the ramifications of consistently adverse ECJ
rulings which contribute weight to Court precedent. Losing a long string of ECJ
cases merely allows the Court to construct an increasingly impenetrable wall of
precedent, and facilitates other member states invoking the acte clair doctrine to
disseminate similar interpretations at the national level. Exercising their
discretion under Article 177 and acte clair, British judges have withheld
references from the Court which might have become ammunition for additional
adverse rulings. In a sense, interpreting EC law themselves instead of facing the
prospect of frequent frustration at the hands of the ECJ achieves a form of
empowerment which the traditional model overlooks. Instead of empowering the
judicial branch against other Community institutions and national governments,
British judges empower themselves by withholding references from the
supranational Court. The ECJ's recent move to curtail its enormous case load by
accepting fewer preliminary references from national courts will provide even
greater scope for British judges to exercise strategic use of Article 177.73
Finally, domestic political pressure may operate differently in each policy 
sector. The examples of environmental policy cases show a reluctance to refer 
to the ECJ despite the general post-1983 trend of more frequent references. 
This reluctance accords with British policies in the field of noise pollution and 
environmental impact assessment. It remains to be seen in which other policy 
sectors British courts have adopted a similarly uncooperative position.
72Ibid.
73For a discussion of the Court's efforts to control its docket, see Anthony Amull, "Judging 





























































































This paper has attempted to test the traditional model of judicial co-operation 
against empirical evidence drawn from British judicial activity since its accession 
to the Community in 1972. The traditional model, supported by Weiler, Burley, 
Mancini, Shapiro and a number of others, maintains that the ECJ requires 
preliminary references from national courts in order to advance European 
integration. The model posits that self-interest propels national judges eagerly to 
make referrals-frequent referrals empower the judicial branch against other 
Community institutions and national governments, and involve national judges in 
the "heady" business of gaining de facto judicial review over their national 
legislatures. It has been argued here that the model fails to account for the 
pattern of preliminary references from British courts. It also fails to explain the 
behaviour of British judges in cases dealing with specific policy sectors such as 
environmental protection.
The traditional model assumes that judicial empowerment will affect courts in 
each member state equally, making no allowances for national constitutional 
traditions or national political pressures. This study has shown that empirical 
evidence does not support such assumptions. Rather, judicial co-operation 
varies significantly amongst the member states. National disparities are evident 
in the number of national cases involving questions of EC law, in the number of 
preliminary references made by courts in each member state, and in the 
proportion of cases involving EC law which national courts referred to the ECJ. 
In the British case, questions of EC law and preliminary references arise far less 
frequently than in other member states. Furthermore, until the middle of the 
1980s, British courts distinguished themselves for their propensity to decide 
questions of EC law themselves instead of referring them to the ECJ. The 
conclusion which emerges most clearly from this study is that analysis must 




























































































within individual policy sectors. Claims about general judicial self-interest fail to 
discriminate between radically different national situations and should therefore 
be treated with caution.
This paper has offered several tentative suggestions on where future analysis 
of judicial co-operation might concentrate. First, national traditions and political 
pressures help explain the glaring disparities amongst member states. Judicial 
empowerment plays a greatly reduced role in Britain, where judicial review 
contrasts sharply with the constitutional tradition of parliamentary supremacy. 
Additionally, British courts operate within a general climate of Euro-pessimism, 
an attitude which might be shared by the judges themselves. Each of these 
factors militate against strengthening European integration and the ECJ through 
active judicial co-operation. The frustration experienced by British judges when 
receiving adverse rulings in previous preliminary references also contributes to 
their lack of judicial co-operation.
In the second half of the 1980s, British courts displayed a relatively higher 
level of judicial co-operation. Changing domestic pressures help explain why 
British judges referred a greater proportion of cases to the ECJ during this 
period. Perhaps the primary factor was the 1983 ruling by the House of Lords 
which encouraged more frequent referrals. This ruling was followed by several 
other British judicial decisions which embraced EC law at the expense of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. These rulings were made despite a general British 
political climate hostile to greater European integration. This raises the question 
whether or not, on the whole, the discretion of British judges under Article 177 is 
unaffected by external political factors. While this paper offers some evidence of 
this independence, it also reveals several measures of judicial co-operation which 
point to the opposite conclusion.
In addition to some of the quantitative evidence, experience from the 
environmental cases also demonstrates the need to refine the existing model to 




























































































EC environmental law to the ECJ, even during recent years of greater judicial co­
operation. Domestic factors may explain this apparent anachronism. In the case 
involving noise pollution, failure to refer to the ECJ allowed British judges to 
uphold stringent standards, in line with Britain's traditional concern for limiting 
noise pollution. In the series of cases involving environmental assessment of 
planning projects, refusal of British judges to refer questions to the ECJ allowed 
them to maintain the practically unfettered discretion of British planning 
authorities. This result accords with Britain's policy of deregulation, and its 
resistance to the EC Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. In each of 
these environmental cases, empowering the ECJ conflicted with domestic 
political pressures. Refusal to refer limited the Court's ability to foster European 
integration, but empowered individual judges through their ability to protect 
British environmental traditions. The British environmental cases indicate that 
any refinement to the existing model of judicial co-operation should draw upon 
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